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Breaking the Crystal Methamphetamine Economy: Illegal
Drugs, Supply-side Interventions and Crime Responses
By ROCCO D’ESTE
University of Sussex
This paper evaluates the effects on crime of supply-side interventions that restricted access to
pseudoephedrine-based medications in the USA, drastically reducing the domestic production of
methamphetamine. I find that these government interventions increased property and violent crime by
around 3–4%, with criminogenic effects lasting for up to 7 months. Stronger evidence is detected in
counties where laboratories producing methamphetamine were previously in operation. My findings
suggest that policy interventions that have a limited effect on supply and no impact on the demand for
drugs could open up the way to unwarranted crime responses. Timely policy implications are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The market for illegal drugs generates an annual cost of $200 billion in the USA
(ONDCP 2010). This figure reflects lost productivity, healthcare expenditures, and—the
focus of this paper—property and violent crime. The scale of the drug–crime nexus is
dramatic: more than 60% of the current prison population, 1.2 million people, tested
positive at the time of arrest for one or more illicit substances. This evidence is even more
emblematic considering that less than 9% of the general US population consumes illicit
drugs, which suggests that drug users are overly represented behind bars (Mumola and
Karberg 2006). Moreover, drug-related crimes are not always directly connected to the
consumption of addictive substances, but can also be related to the production and
distribution of the drug itself (DEA 2010).
To eradicate these clandestine markets and deter drug usage, the US government
widely employs supply-side interventions that target the producers and distributors of
illicit substances. Arguably, improving our understanding of the consequences of these
government interventions is critical for the design of cost-effective regulatory
frameworks: as a policy principle, these should be aimed at reducing the growth of illegal
drug markets while also mitigating the risks associated with the emergence of unintended
criminal responses.
My paper focuses on methamphetamine, also known as ‘meth’, an addictive
neurotoxic stimulant that generates irreversible health damage (Rawson et al. 2001;
Simon et al. 2001; Lynch et al. 2003). Methamphetamine is considered one of the most
dangerous illegal drugs in the USA because of its alleged effects in fostering both
property and violent crime (DEA 2010).
Specifically, I examine the effects on property and violent crime of supply-side
policies that have restricted access to pseudoephedrine-based medications. These
common medications are a critical input that can be used to synthesize
methamphetamine in low-capacity domestic laboratories (labs), which are predominantly
operated throughout the USA by local independent methamphetamine users (Eck and
Gersh 2000; Sexton et al. 2006). In the attempt to constrain the spread of these small
labs, in the USA a comprehensive set of state and federal laws regulating the sale of
pseudoephedrine-based medications was phased in between 2004 and 2006. These laws
targeted such medications by (i) dictating purchasing quotas, (ii) regulating the
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placement of the product in stores to reduce the likelihood of theft, (iii) requiring that
purchasers be asked to present a form of identification, and (iv) requesting that retailers
maintain a logbook of clients to prevent repeated purchases.
Recent work by Dobkin et al. (2014) shows that these policies were successful in
reducing the number of operating meth labs by around 36%. In particular, the laws
heavily disrupted the drug market composed of small-scale illegal operations, which were
producing less than two ounces of product at a time. Labs producing larger quantities of
methamphetamine were less affected, presumably due to the capacity of professional
drug networks to divert larger quantities of pseudoephedrine from other sources. After
further investigating the impact of the over-the-counter (OTC) restrictions on drug-
related crimes, Dobkin et al. (2014) find no evidence of changes in possession and sale of
narcotics and non-narcotics. This evidence, alongside the lack of any significant effects
on drug consumption and purity-adjusted market prices, suggests that
methamphetamine users were able to circumvent the laws, finding the illegal drug
elsewhere or through other channels.1
I extend the work of Dobkin et al. (2014) by asking the following question: does the
disruption of crystal methamphetamine domestic markets—through the implementation
of OTC restrictions—affect property and violent crime rates? Understanding possible
effects of these interventions on property and violent crime is important for at least two
reasons. First, this evidence is needed to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the
policy, given the close connection existing between criminal activity and the disrupted
methamphetamine market. Second, this evaluation can inform policymakers about
possible effects on crime of similar interventions aimed at further restricting the access to
methamphetamine’s chemical precursors. This is an important aspect given that the
methamphetamine ‘epidemic’ is far from over in the USA and many other countries.2
The laws dramatically reduced the accessibility of pseudoephedrine-based medication
—increasing their price in the underground market (Sexton et al. 2006)—suddenly
diminishing the availability of methamphetamine produced domestically and the number
of operating labs of small dimensions. The laws did not affect larger producers and
distributors of methamphetamine and did not change the consumption of the drug. The
possible effects on crime are not obvious ex ante. On the one hand, the laws might have
led to an increase in violence committed by criminal groups fighting over the newly
available drug markets. Also, the OTC restrictions might have increased acquisitive
crimes due to users’ need to compensate for the higher costs of domestic production
imposed by the laws, as well as to pay for the resulting increase in the cost of addiction.3
On the other hand, the OTC restrictions might have reduced crime if a large share of
illicit activity was directly originating from the functioning of the domestic production of
methamphetamine, and if its sudden reduction allowed police officers to be more effective
in deterring other forms of crime. I believe that these ambiguous theoretical predictions
raise the need for compelling empirical evidence.
This paper provides credible estimates of the net effects of the OTC restrictions on
crime. My state-level difference-in-differences analysis, which exploits monthly variation
in the staggered implementation of the laws across the USA, indicates that the
implementation of the OTC reforms led to criminogenic effects. I find an increase of
around 3–4% in both property and violent crimes (larceny and burglary, and assault,
respectively). I further examine the local impacts of the regulations matching Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime data aggregated at the county level to Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) information on the locations of clandestine meth labs. This
allows me to conduct a more flexible investigation of the heterogeneous criminal
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responses in counties arguably characterized by a diverse prevalence of
methamphetamine production and usage. I find stronger evidence of crime responses in
counties where enforcement agencies indicate that meth labs were in operation prior to
the implementation of the policy. These results appear to be consistent with the
underlying nature of the domestic market disrupted by the laws, in which production,
distribution and usage are strongly interconnected and are inherently characterized by a
very local dimension (DEA 2010).
An event-study analysis reveals that the effects on crime are well timed, appearing
right on impact of the implementation of the policy, and lasting for about 5–7 months.
State-level and county-level estimates hold up to an extensive battery of checks, such as
the use of linear specifications and count data of criminal episodes. I show that estimated
coefficients are stable to the exclusion of covariates and state-specific linear time trends
from the estimating equations. Similarly, estimates are robust to the use of state-specific
quadratic and cubic trends. This mitigates concerns that non-linear unobservable trends,
correlated with a state’s decision to implement a law and the propagation of criminal
activity within its territory, might be critical confounders in the analysis. Finally, more
than 20 placebo tests lend further support to the credibility of the estimates, indicating
that my findings on the criminogenic effects of the OTC reforms are indeed reliable.
My findings complement the evaluation of the OTC restrictions conducted by
Dobkin et al. (2014) by revealing that the policies led to criminogenic effects. It is worth
noting that a moderate increase in crime of around 2–4% could hide a more sizeable
impact on the criminal propensity of the subpopulation that was most affected by the
reforms. At the time of implementation, the approximate share of meth-related crimes in
counties where the meth epidemic was occurring was around 20–50% (Kyle and Hansell
2005).4 Thus my estimates on property crimes—likely committed by a population
gravitating around the domestic production of the drug—suggest that the laws might
have increased their criminal propensity by 6–20%. Moreover, the economic costs
connected with the policies were not negligible. My results, combined with the estimates
of the costs of property and violent crimes reported by Heaton (2010), quantify an
average economic cost of around $3.9 million in counties where crime increased as a
consequence of the reforms.5 Overall, my estimates suggest that government
interventions that effectively disrupt only part of the illegal supply and leave unchanged
the demand for illicit substances can produce unintended crime responses. For these
reasons, my results provide direct support for supply-side interventions that should be
implemented in conjunction with monitoring programmes and crime-prevention
strategies targeting areas characterized by severe drug problems.
My work contributes to the literature investigating the effects of supply-side
interventions on criminal activity. The findings are rather mixed. Dobkin and Nicosia
(2009) examine the impacts in California of a different supply-side measure targeting
methamphetamine in 1995. While they detect a large disruption on both the supply and
the demand side of the methamphetamine market, they find no substantial evidence of
effects on property and violent crime, with some evidence of a possible increase in
robberies. However, the authors argue that these results need to be taken with some
caution because the crime responses were concentrated in counties with low
methamphetamine usage. In a different context, Adda et al. (2014) show that a cannabis
depenalization policy in the London borough of Lambeth caused police to reallocate
efforts toward non-drug-related crime, leading to a reduction in all such felonies. Dell
(2015) uses a regression discontinuity design to show that drug-related violence tends to
increase substantially after close elections of National Action Party mayors in Mexico.
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Her findings indicate that this violence is caused by rival traffickers’ attempts to usurp
territories after police crackdowns weaken incumbent criminals. Gavrilova et al. (2018)
study the effect of medical marijuana laws on crime, and indicate that decriminalization
of the production and distribution of drugs could lead to a reduction in violence in
markets where organized crime is pushed out by licit competition.6
More broadly, my study is connected with the literature examining the drug–crime
nexus. Corman and Mocan (2000) provide evidence on the crime-deterrence relationship,
using time series variation of a monthly-level dataset for New York City. They find that
the effects of law enforcement on crime are stronger and more significant than those of
drug usage. Grogger and Willis (2000) study how the emergence of crack cocaine affected
crime in 27 US metropolitan areas, and show that the introduction of crack had
substantial effects on violent crime but essentially no effect on property crime, suggesting
that this technological innovation increased violence on the part of distributors. Angrist
and Kugler (2008) study the consequences of a major shift in the production of coca
paste from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, and suggest that the rural areas that saw an
increase in coca production became much more violent. Fryer et al. (2013) also
investigate the impact of crack cocaine on crime, constructing an index based on a range
of indirect proxies. Their analysis implies that the greatest social costs of crack have been
associated with prohibition-related violence rather than drug use per se.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the institutional background.
Section II describes the data and research design. Section III presents the results.
Section IV provides the conclusion and discusses the timely policy implications of my
work.
I. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
During the period of analysis, methamphetamine was primarily distributed in the USA
by professional criminal organizations. These organizations were producing large
quantities of methamphetamine in ‘super labs’ based in Southern California and
Northern Mexico. The criminal groups were diverting sizeable quantities of ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine—the essential ingredient in the synthesis of crystal methamphetamine
—maintaining large-scale operations. Furthermore, they were controlling all aspects
related to the distribution and sale of the illegal substance, which was typically
distributed in the USA by Mexican drug trafficking groups and US gangs related to them
(Gonzales et al. 2010).
During the 1990s, small labs producing methamphetamine became widespread in the
USA. This growth was fostered by the availability of pseudoephedrine, which was
contained in common medicines alleviating flu symptoms. This chemical component
could be extracted from these medicines via a simple and inexpensive chemical process
that involved little equipment, few supplies, and almost no expertise in chemistry.7 The
domestic producer of methamphetamine was often a heavy user who started
manufacturing the illicit drug to sustain his drug addiction. The network gravitating
around the domestic production of methamphetamine was characterized by many
separate small groups with weak organizational structure, and the production and
consumption of the drug happened inside the boundaries of these segmented markets.
Methamphetamine produced domestically was typically sold within this close network of
drug addicts rather than to strangers on the street (Eck and Gersh 2000).
Small labs were responsible for a minor part of the methamphetamine distributed in
the USA. However, they created numerous problems for local communities. The
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manufacturing process was highly volatile. Flammable chemicals used in the
manufacturing process often resulted in toxic fumes, fires and explosions. These
generated serious concerns regarding environmental contamination and dangers to first
responders, law enforcement, and other members of society exposed to such labs (Shukla
et al. 2012). The spread of these labs also led to increased social costs associated with
burden of addiction, premature death of users, drug treatment expenditures, lost
productivity, healthcare, child endangerment, crime and criminal justice expenses
(Nicosia et al. 2009).
To reduce the growth of the domestic market for methamphetamine and the various
costs associated with its presence, between 2004 and 2005, 35 states passed laws that
imposed restrictions on the OTC sale of pseudoephedrine-based medications. The laws
targeted pseudoephedrine-based medications by (i) dictating purchasing quotas,
(ii) regulating the placement of the product in stores to reduce the likelihood of theft,
(iii) requiring that purchasers be asked to present a form of identification, and
(iv) requesting that retailers maintain a logbook of clients to prevent repeated purchases.
The most common OTC regulations adopted at the state level involved purchasing
quotas and required that the pseudoephedrine-based medications were placed in secure
locations. The majority of states also required clients to present a form of identification,
and 24 states required that retailers maintain a logbook to avoid repeated purchases. In
2006, all jurisdictions in the USA became subject to the Combat Methamphetamine
Epidemic Act (CMEA), a federal policy that set a national standard for the legal sale of
these medications. In April 2006, purchase limits were applied at the federal level. In
September 2006, the other three types of restrictions were implemented. In practice, the
stricter provisions were applied in each state, irrespective of whether they were contained
in a state law or the federal one. If, for instance, a state did not impose any identification
request in its regulation, then starting from September 2006, it had to comply with the
identification request contained in the federal act.8
Dobkin et al. (2014) record the date on which each of these four restrictions went
into effect in all states. As in their work, my empirical analysis focuses on the date of first
implementation of any of these regulations (I code the implementation of the federal law
in April of 2006). Tables A1 and A2 of the Online Appendix document the date of
adoption of the various OTC regulations by state. Figure 1 shows the change in the share
of states with an applicable regulation, providing an accurate graphical representation of
the variation associated with the rollout of the laws, which I exploit in my empirical
design. Importantly, the staggered rollout of the policies allows for identifying the effects
of the restrictions on crime in each state separately while controlling for common time
trends across the USA.9
II. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Data
The main dataset used in the analysis is the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR):
Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest. Law enforcement agencies voluntarily report
the monthly counts of different types of crime committed in their territory, including
murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. The UCR data
are the best public available data on crime in the USA; however, not all FBI agencies
report crimes each year, and within a given year, not all agencies report crimes in each
calendar month.10 To reduce the concerns related to the entry and exit of law
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enforcement agencies in the data, my state- and county-level analyses use information
extracted from a balanced panel of law enforcement agencies that consistently reported
monthly crimes around the time of the implementation of the laws. As in the work of
Dobkin et al. (2014), I assembled a dataset that starts in January 2002 and ends in March
2008, including 75 month–year periods. This contains monthly information for 48 US
states and the District of Columbia (DC), covering 1942 counties. Florida and Rhode
Island are excluded from the analysis because FBI agencies within these states did not
consistently report crime during the period of interest. The UCR data also contain
information about the population covered by each FBI agency. This information allows
for the construction of population weights that I employ in the empirical analysis.11
The National Clandestine Laboratory Register contains dates and addresses of the
locations at which law enforcement agencies reported finding a meth lab.12 A lab seizure
is defined as seizure from ‘an illicit operation consisting of a sufficient combination of
apparatus and chemicals that either has been or could be used in the manufacture or
synthesis of controlled substances’. The register also records the presence of chemicals or
equipment usually associated with the manufacturing of the drug, and the locations at
which empty pseudoephedrine containers were abandoned. This information is publicly
available from 2004 and is used to identify counties where meth labs were likely to be in
operation prior to the implementation of the OTC restrictions. Arguably, in these
locations, one can expect to identify larger or more precise effects of the reforms on
crime.
The database is further supplemented with state–month measures of unemployment,
number of households receiving food stamps, and average temperature and
precipitation.13 Data on weather conditions are unavailable for DC and Hawaii. The






























FIGURE 1. Share of US states with applicable OTC restriction.
Notes: This figure shows the change in the share of states with an applicable regulation on methamphetamine
chemical precursors. It shows that 12 states enacted a law restricting access to pseudoephedrine-based
medications in July 2005, and 15 states had a first applicable law (national or federal) in April 2006. All the
dates of implementation are reported in Tables A1 and A2 of the Online Appendix (Dobkin et al. 2014).
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always observed (47 US states in 75 time periods), which allows me to capture changes in
coefficients across specifications that are not driven by changes in the composition of the
sample. However, I show in the Online Appendix estimates obtained sequentially,
including state-specific trends and covariates. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on
crime and state covariates that are not discussed due to brevity considerations only.
Descriptive statistics on meth labs will be discussed when relevant for the empirical
analysis.
Research design
State-level analysis I use the following model to estimate the effects of the OTC
regulations on crime:
ys;t ¼ b1OTCs;t þ as þ ct þ ls  tþ b2X0s;t þ s;t;ð1Þ
where ys,t isthe crime outcome in state s at time t (month–year level, e.g. April 2005).
The variable of interest, OTCs,t, is an indicator set to 0 in the months prior to the
implementation of a state’s regulation, and it takes the value 1 in the months afterwards.
I set this variable as the fraction of the month in which the regulation was active during
the month when a regulation was first implemented.14 State fixed effects as absorb
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Property crimes
Larceny 3675 210.7 54.2 75.4 547.6
Burglary 3675 67 21.6 14.5 125.4
Motor vehicle theft 3675 42.2 19.1 1.5 184.8
Violent crimes
Robbery 3675 14.8 7.2 0 84.6
Assault 3675 122.7 44.8 31.8 372.2
Rape 3675 2.8 1.1 0 29.5
Murder 3675 0.6 0.3 0 6
Controls
Unemployment 3675 5 1.1 2.3 9.5
Food stamps 3675 204,025 208,391 4481 1,156,940
Average precipitation (mm) 3525 3.1 2 0 15.9
Average temperature (°F) 3525 51.3 17.8 -4.7 84.4
Notes
Descriptive statistics at the state–month level from January 2002 to March 2008. Data are for 48 US states plus
the District of Columbia (DC). Florida and Rhode Island are not included in the analysis because FBI agencies
in these states did not consistently report crime data during the period under analysis. The panel includes
75 months (49 states * 75 months = 3675 observations). Data on weather conditions are unavailable for DC
and Hawaii (3675  (75*2) = 3525). Descriptive statistics on crime are expressed per 100,000 people and are
weighted by population as in estimating equation (1). Precipitation is expressed in millimetres. Temperature is
expressed in degrees Fahrenheit. Data sources: crime, FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports—Offenses Known and
Clearances by Arrest; unemployment, US Census Bureau; number of households receiving food stamps,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, US Department of Agriculture; weather, US National Climatic
Data Center.
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unobservable time-invariant differences across states. Month–year fixed effects ct control
for uniform changes in criminal activity in the USA, fitting a different intercept for each
of the 75 periods in the sample (e.g. intercept for May 2005, intercept for June 2005).
State-specific linear trends ls 9 t capture potential unobservable confounders related to
both the implementation of the OTC laws in a state and the propagation of criminal
activity in its territory. I also add a vector of state–month covariates X0s;t, as discussed
above. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The coefficient of interest, b1,
measures the effect of the OTC regulations on crime. In the baseline specification, crime
is log transformed using log(1+z), where z is the crime rate per 100,000 people. However,
I will show very similar results when I use a linear specification that includes crime rates
as outcome or a Poisson model that uses the count of criminal episodes.
My analysis uses data assembled from the population of FBI agencies consistently
reporting crime during each month between January 2002 and March 2008. Given that
the population of the FBI agencies reporting crime varies widely across states and
counties, I employ a weighted least squares (WLS) estimator, using as weight the
population covered by the FBI agencies reporting crime in a state–year. The WLS
estimator consistently estimates the population linear projection of the dependent
variable on the explanatory variable; that is, it estimates the impact of the OTC
restrictions on crime rates experienced by the population in the sample that was affected
by the regulation. Also, given that in my data the population varies widely across
geographical groups, the group average error term is heteroscedastic, and the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation is inefficient and leads to inconsistent standard errors.
Instead, the WLS estimator is the minimum variance linear unbiased estimator that
produces consistent standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity (Deaton 1997;
Solon et al. 2015). In the robustness section, I will compare size and precision of the
point estimates using the WLS and OLS estimators. The latter applies the same weights
to all observations in the sample, regardless of the population included in each
geographical cluster.
Event-study analysis I further investigate the consistency of the results by implementing
an event-study analysis, which enhances our understanding of the impacts of the OTC
reforms on crime in at least two ways. First, it allows for examining the presence of
possible ‘pre-trends’ that might confound the estimates of the coefficient of interest, b1.
Second, it helps to identify the dynamic effects of the regulations, whether the crime
responses emerge on impact of the enactment of the laws, and their persistence over time.




li1ðqs;t ¼ iÞ þ as þ ct þ ls  tþ b3X0s;t þ ;ð2Þ
where the indicator qs,t measures the month relative to the introduction of an OTC
regulation. I define qs,t =0 if state s enacted an OTC regulation at any time during
month t. For each specification, I estimate 25 li coefficients associated with indicator
variables running from 12 months before the implementation of the laws to 12 months
after.15 All other details are equal to estimating equation (1): Crime is log-transformed; I
include state fixed effects, time fixed effects, state-specific linear trends and state–month
covariates; regressions are weighted by the population covered by the FBI agencies
reporting crime in a state–year; and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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County-level analysis The baseline analysis exploits state-level variation that originates
from the different timing of implementation of the laws across various US states.
However, given that the intensity of the methamphetamine epidemic might significantly
vary within a state, I also explore the county-level dimension of the data. Because the
FBI agency-level data can be aggregated at the county level, and the National
Clandestine Laboratory Register contains the addresses of the locations at which law
enforcement agencies indicated the presence of clandestine drug labs, I employ a more
flexible empirical strategy to examine the presence of heterogeneous criminal responses in
counties arguably characterized by a larger domestic production of methamphetamine.
Specifically, I compare the impact of the reforms in ‘Meth producer’ counties (i.e.
counties where at least one lab was reported to be in operation prior to the
implementation of the laws) to ‘Other’ counties (where no such labs were found). I
estimate the model
yc;t ¼ b4OTCs;t þ ac þ ct þ ls  tþ b5X0s;t þ c;t;ð3Þ
where crime yc,t is measured in a county c at month–year t. The assembled county-level
panel dataset allows for the inclusion of county fixed effects ac that control for
unobservable time-invariant differences across counties. The estimating equation also
includes time-fixed effect ct, state-specific linear trends ls 9 t, and state–month covariates
X0s;t.
16 The coefficient of interest, b4, identifies within-county changes in criminal activity
due to the implementation of the OTC reforms. Crime is log-transformed as in estimating
equation (1), but very similar results will be shown when using crime rates or count data
of crime as outcome variables. Regressions are weighted by the population covered by
the FBI agencies reporting crime in a county–year. Given that, as in equation (1), I use
state-level variation associated with the implementation of the policy, I cluster standard
errors at the state level.
III. RESULTS
The effects of the OTC restrictions on crime
Results Table 2 reports the b1 coefficients estimated using model (1). Panel A shows
the estimates of the effects of the OTC restrictions on larceny, burglary and assault in
columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively.17 I find that the implementation of the OTC
reforms led to criminogenic effects: I detect a 3.2% increase in larcenies (p < 0.05), a 3%
increase in burglaries (p < 0.05), and a 2.8% increase in aggravated assaults (p < 0.01).
Similarly, panel B of Table 2 shows the effects of the reforms on these crimes, but it
excludes from the sample US jurisdictions that did not adopt any internal measure to
regulate the sale of pseudoephedrine-based medication, possibly because they were less
affected by the domestic production of methamphetamine. These excluded jurisdictions
were subject to only the federal CMEA.18 In practice, I argue that the exclusion from the
sample of jurisdictions only marginally affected by the domestic production of
methamphetamine should not heavily affect my estimates if the criminogenic effects of
the OTC restrictions are mainly related to the disruption of this illegal operation.19
Consistent with this hypothesis, panel B shows b1 point estimates that range from 3.6%
to 2.7%, all precisely estimated with p < 0.05 for burglary and assault, and p < 0.01 for
larceny. The stability of the results in this subsample of states provides initial reassurance
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that the crime responses are closely related to the disruption of the domestic market for
methamphetamine, rather than to seemingly unrelated factors.
Robustness checks I show the sensitivity of b1 when state-specific linear trends and all
the covariates are sequentially included in estimating equation (1) for the entire sample
of the analysis (Table A3 of the Online Appendix) and for the sample that excludes states
subject to only the federal CMEA (Table A4). Table A3 shows that the estimate for
aggravated assault is stable (ranging from 2.9% to 3.1%) and always highly significant (p
< 0.01) across specifications. The estimates for larceny gain in size and precision when
adding state-specific linear trends, from 2.5% (p < 0.1) to 3.2% (p < 0.05), and are stable
when including covariates. Similarly, the estimates for burglary gain in precision and size
when state linear trends and covariates are included: 2.1% (p < 0.11), 2.5% (p < 0.1), and
3% (p < 0.05), respectively. This indicates that state-specific linear trends and covariates
absorb omitted factors negatively correlated to the implementation of the laws and the
propagation of burglary and larceny within a state. This could suggest, for instance, that
the implementation of the OTC regulations might be correlated with the participation or
the intensity of social programmes (such as community aid or addiction treatment
programmes), which—in turn—might have led to a reduction of economically motivated
crimes.20 Table A4 of the Online Appendix, which reduces the noise in the estimates by
excluding from the sample states possibly less affected by the domestic production of
methamphetamine where only the federal CMEA was implemented, shows highly
significant estimates across specifications for larceny and assault (at least p < 0.05 in all
specifications). The estimated coefficients for burglary still gain in size and precision
when trends and covariates are added to the estimating equation: 2.1% (p < 0.13) at the
baseline; 2.4% (p < 0.1) when state linear trends are added; 3.2% (p < 0.05) when
covariates are included. Table A5 of the Online Appendix shows a similar exercise in
TABLE 2
THE EFFECT OF THE OTC RESTRICTION ON CRIME: STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Larceny Burglary Assault
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Sample including 47 states
OTC restriction 0.0323** 0.0302** 0.0279***
(0.0130) (0.0129) (0.00907)
Panel B: Sample excluding states where only federal law applied
OTC restriction 0.0366*** 0.0322** 0.0272**
(0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0120)
Notes
This table shows the b1 coefficients on larceny, burglary and assault obtained using equation (1), which includes
state and month–year fixed effects, state linear trends, and covariates. The variable of interest, ‘OTC restriction’,
is an indicator set to 0 in the months prior to implementation of a state’s regulation, and to 1 afterwards, and
the fraction of the month in which the regulation was active during the month when a regulation was first
implemented. Panel A shows results for the entire sample of analysis (47 states and 3525 observations). Panel B
shows results for a subsample excluding jurisdictions that did not pass a state law and were subject to only the
federal one (39 states and 2595 observations). The excluded jurisdictions are Connecticut, DC, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania and Utah. Crime is transformed into
logarithmic form log(1 + z), where z is the crime rate per 100,000 people. Regressions are weighted by
population of the agencies reporting crime in a state-month. Standard errors clustered at the state level are
shown in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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which trends and covariates are sequentially included, focusing on the counties where
meth labs were in operation prior to the enactment of the policy (both in the sample
including all states and in the sample that excludes states that only enacted a federal law).
Estimates with and without trends and covariates are shown to be precise under the
conventional significance levels for all crimes in this subset of counties, where we should
expect the laws to have more ‘bite’. In particular, when ‘Meth producer’ counties in states
that enacted a state law are considered, the estimates for burglary range from 3.5% to
4% and are always highly significant (p < 0.01). Tables A3 and A4 also report results for
other crimes and show no large or significant effects of the reforms on motor vehicle
thefts, robbery, assault and rape. Thus the remainder of the analysis will exclusively focus
on larceny, burglary and aggravated assault.21 Table 3 reports further robustness checks
for model (1) on these crimes (panels A, B and C, respectively).
Column (1) of Table 3 investigates the robustness of the estimates to changes in the
functional form, reporting the results of a linear specification using crime rates per
100,000 people as its outcome. I detect point estimates of 7.4 (p < 0.01) for larceny, 1.9 (p
< 0.05) for burglary, and 3.9 (p < 0.01) for assault. Considering the mean of these
outcome variables reported in Table 1, the linear specification provides results of very
similar magnitude and precision compared to the log-transformed baseline estimates.
Column (2) shows the estimates obtained via a Poisson model using count data of crime
as its outcome. Again, these estimates are very similar in size and precision to the baseline
results. For the sake of comparison, column (3) reports the baseline estimates of
model (1) obtained using a log-specification that includes state fixed effects, year fixed
effects, state-specific linear trends, and covariates. Column (4) adds to column (3) state-
specific quadratic trends. Column (5) adds to column (4) state-specific cubic trends. On
the one hand, these specifications absorb non-linear unobservable patterns associated
with the passage of the reforms and with the propagation of crime within a state. That is,
the inclusion of state-specific trends helps to remove potentially spurious correlations
that could be wrongly interpreted as caused by the independent variable that moves
along a trend correlated with the trend of the outcome. On the other hand,
superimposing exogenous trends could remove genuine correlation, over-absorbing the
effect of interest, producing overfitting, leading to conservative and imprecise estimates
(Buonanno et al. 2011). Columns (4) and (5) show that the results are little affected by
the inclusion of these non-linear trends; however, the estimates are still positive and
significant. When including state quadratic trends, I detect an increase of 2.2% (p < 0.1)
for larceny, 2.1% (p < 0.1) for burglary, and 2.1% (p < 0.05) for assault. When including
state cubic trends, I detect an increase of 2.5% (p < 0.05) for larceny, 2.4% (p < 0.1) for
burglary, and 2.3% (p < 0.01) for assault. Overall, this exercise appears to attenuate the
concerns that the estimates of b1 might be driven by state-specific non-linear time trends
correlated with both the implementation of the reforms and the propagation of crime
within a state. Taken at face value, conservative estimates obtained including up to state-
cubic trends, reveal an impact of the laws on crime in the range 2–2.5%.
In column (6) of Table 3, I exclude the month in which the reform was enacted,
where the OTC restrictions are coded as a fraction of the month during which the law
was operating. Estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline.
Column (7) reports estimates obtained using a balanced panel of 23 months before and
after the regulations, where all states are observed for the exact number of periods.
Estimates are similar in terms of size and precision for burglary and larceny. For assault,
I observe a drop of around 28% in the point estimate (0.02 instead of 0.028, with p <
0.05). In this exercise, I use a balanced sample around the time of first implementation of
Economica
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the reforms. This implies that relatively more observations from states that adopted the
laws early in time (and that are therefore tracked for longer in my data) are excluded
from this analysis. The smaller estimate may suggest that in some of these states, the
effects on assault were relatively large two years after the implementation of the laws.
However, given that this specification excludes 40% of the observations, smaller
estimates could also be due to random sampling variability.
Weighted vs. unweighted estimates In the baseline analysis, I employ a WLS estimator
using as weight the population covered by the FBI agencies reporting crime in a state-
year. This is because the population of the FBI agencies reporting crime varies widely
across states. The WLS estimator consistently estimates the population linear projection
of the dependent variable on the explanatory variable, and it produces consistent
standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity (Deaton 1997; Solon et al. 2015). In
Table A7 of the Online Appendix, I report weighted and unweighted estimates, with the
latter applying the same weights to all observations in the sample, regardless of the
population included in each geographical cluster. Column (1) shows the weighted
baseline, and column (2) reports OLS unweighted estimates. OLS estimates are less
precise, with standard errors increasing by 15%, 30% and 50% for larceny, burglary and
assault, respectively. In terms of size, estimates for aggravated assault are rather stable
across specifications. Estimates for larceny and burglary are smaller when using the OLS
estimator. Differences between weighted and unweighted estimates signal the presence of
heterogeneous effects by population (Solon et al. 2015). These are investigated in the
remainder of the table. I split the sample using the median of the state population, and
show weighted and unweighted results in each subsample. Estimates indicate that the
effects of the policy are stronger in highly populated states. Point estimates for all crimes
are in the range 3–4% and are always highly significant. Also, when focusing on the
sample above the population median, we observe that weighted and unweighted
estimates are similar in terms of magnitude and precision. Estimates for the states below
the median are generally imprecise and of smaller magnitude, with the smallest point
estimates detected for larceny. Overall, these exercises indicate that the laws restricting
the OTC restrictions had a larger and more significant effect on property crimes in highly
populated areas. A possible explanation could be that the expected returns from theft
could be larger in these areas, as there could be more targets for criminals, thus
incentivizing the increase in property crimes.
Placebo tests I now present the results of various placebo tests, where the primary
analysis implemented using model (1) is replicated with a pseudo treatment variable that
—deliberately—does not affect the outcome of interest. The true value of the estimand is
zero, and the goal of the placebo analysis is to provide support for the identification
strategy behind the primary analysis by assessing whether the pseudo treatment leads to
estimates that are close to zero, taking into account the statistical uncertainty (Athey and
Imbens 2017).
Table 4 presents the results for larceny, burglary and assault (panels A, B and C,
respectively). Column (1) reports the estimates of b1 obtained in the primary analysis for
initial comparison. In column (2), the pseudo treatment variable is drawn from the same
distribution as the original variable used in the primary analysis, but its values are
randomly assigned to the outcome. In column (3), I preserve the real within-state time
structure of the laws, randomly assigning crime outcomes to the original treatment
variable. Following Neumayer and Pl€umper (2017), in both columns (2) and (3), I
Economica
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perform 1000 permutations for each crime to minimize the likelihood that a single
distributed placebo variable could affect the results by chance. I report the mean of the
point estimates, the standard errors, and the p-values. Columns (4)–(9) show other
placebo estimates where the pseudo treatment also preserves the within-state time
structure of the laws used in the primary analysis, but it is moved 4, 3 and 2 years before
and after the real implementation date. In each of these regressions, the sample is moved
accordingly, starting and ending 4, 3 and 2 years earlier and later, respectively. This
allows for consistency with the primary analysis, which always uses a sample that
includes 75 time periods.22 Out of the 24-point estimates reported in Table 4, the placebo
regression reveals a positive and significant coefficient only for larceny, when the
enactment date is moved 3 years before the real date of implementation (coefficient 3.8%
with p < 0.05). The estimates in the remaining 23 placebo exercises are close to zero and
are not precisely estimated under the conventional significance levels. The evidence
provides further support for the identification strategy behind the primary analysis,
indicating that the estimates of the effects of the OTC reforms on crime are indeed
reliable.
Event study I now examine the dynamics of the intervention in an event-study analysis.
Figure 2 reports point estimates of dummy variables indicating the months following
(leading up to) the implementation of the OTC restrictions. I use estimating equation (2),
which includes state fixed effects, month–year fixed effects, state linear trends, and
covariates.
The effects on crime are well timed, appearing right on impact of the
implementation of the policy. The magnitude of the effects is moderate and in line
with the estimates of model (1): Effects are slightly larger for property than for
violent crimes. The impact of the reforms fades out 5 months after the rollout of the
laws for larceny and burglary, while it lasts slightly longer for aggravated assault,
returning to pre-intervention levels after 7 months. Trends appear to be relatively flat
prior to the implementation of the laws. In particular, highly significant estimates
with p < 0.01 are detected for larceny during the 5 months after the passage of the
law, except in period 1 (the month after the implementation), where p < 0.05, and
period +1, where the estimate is not precise under the conventional significance levels.
For burglary, estimates become positive during the month of implementation and are
significantly different from zero in periods +2 and +3 (p < 0.05) and in period +4 (p <
0.01). For assault, significant estimates are detected during the 7 months after the
implementation of the laws (p < 0.05), except in periods 0 and +3, where estimates
are significant at the 10% level. The analysis of the time preceding the
implementation of the laws reveals a significant effect in just one out of the 36 pre-
intervention dummies (for burglary in period 8, with p < 0.1). This seems to reduce
the concerns that pre-trends might be a significant driver of the findings.23
Subgroup analysis
The county-level data allow for a more flexible investigation of heterogeneous criminal
responses in counties arguably characterized by a diverse pre-intervention prevalence of
methamphetamine. In this subsection, I investigate whether the laws generated larger
crime responses in counties where domestic production was likely taking place.
Specifically, I locate these counties using DEA information on meth lab seizures prior to
the intervention. Figure 3 shows that the prevalence of methamphetamine production
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FIGURE 2. Event-study analysis (point estimates and confidence intervals).
Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of rollout dummies obtained using
equation (2), which includes state fixed effects, month–year fixed effects, state linear trends, and covariates. I
show the results for larceny, burglary and assault.
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varies widely within the USA. This map shows counties where at least one meth lab was
seized in 2004, coloured in dark grey. Counties where no meth lab was seized in 2004 are
coloured in light grey. The majority of labs are located on the West coast, in the Midwest,
and in the East South-Central regions of the USA.
In Table 5, I report results obtained using model (3) for larceny, burglary and
aggravated assault. For each of these crimes, I report b4 coefficients estimated in two
separate samples: First, I focus on the sample of 721 ‘Meth producer’ counties where at
least one lab was discovered in 2004. I posit that in this subset of counties, the reforms
might have had larger effects on crime. Second, I focus on 1219 ‘Other’ counties where no
lab was found in 2004. Arguably, in these areas, the domestic production of
methamphetamine was less prevalent, and the laws restricting the sale of
pseudoephedrine-based medications may have had a minor impact on local crime.
As in the preceding part of the analysis, panel A of Table 5 shows the estimates of
the entire sample of states. For ‘Meth producer’ counties, I detect an increase of 3.9% in
larceny (p < 0.01), 3.3% in burglary (p < 0.05), and 4% in assault (p < 0.01). As previously
hypothesized, these effects are larger in counties where at least one lab was found in 2004.
The point estimates for ‘Other’ counties are around one-third of the corresponding
estimates for ‘Meth producer’ counties for larceny and assault, and half the size for
burglary. Estimates for ‘Meth producer’ counties are not significantly different from
zero.
In panel B of Table 5, I repeat the same exercise, but I focus on the restricted sample,
which excludes jurisdictions that were subject to only the federal CMEA. Looking at the
‘Meth producer’ counties, the b4 estimates for burglary and larceny are larger than the
analogous ones in the sample including all states (4.4% and 4%, respectively). For
assault, the estimate is slightly smaller than the corresponding one in panel A (3.6%).
These point estimates are precisely estimated at the 1% risk level. Focusing on ‘Other’
counties instead, I detect a positive effect of 2.4% (p < 0.1) on larceny. However, some
caution is warranted when interpreting this last estimate, as it is highly sensitive to the
inclusion of state linear trends and state covariates (see panel D of Table A6 in the
FIGURE 3. Lab seizures pre-intervention (year 2004).
Notes: This map shows counties where at least one meth lab was seized in 2004 (‘Meth producers’) coloured
in dark grey. Counties where no meth labs were seized in 2004 (‘Others’) are coloured in light grey. Alaska
and Hawaii are eliminated from the figure for illustrative purposes only. Source: DEA (2010).
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Online Appendix). Estimates in ‘Other’ counties are around one-third to half the size of
the corresponding estimates for ‘Meth producer’ counties and are not significantly
different from zero.
Discussion This part of the analysis substantiates the underlying hypothesis of the
work: The increase in crime appears to be closely related to the disruption of the local
production of methamphetamine.24 However, two aspects need to be discussed. First,
estimates for ‘Meth producer’ and ‘Other’ counties, while of different sizes and precisions
in the two subsamples, are not significantly different from each other. The p-values for
the differences of the estimates do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of the
coefficients under the conventional significance levels (as reported in Table 5). This could
be due to a variety of factors. Given that the seizures represent only a share of the labs
effectively in operation, one cannot exclude the presence of labs producing
TABLE 5









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Sample including 47 states
OTC restriction 0.0393*** 0.0121 0.0332** 0.0161 0.0400*** 0.0129





Counties 721 1219 721 1219 721 1219
Outcome mean 232.91 180.92 75.81 54.99 129.46 114.37
Observations 54,075 91,425 54,075 91,425 54,075 91,425
Panel B: Sample excluding states where only federal law applied
OTC restriction 0.0441*** 0.0239* 0.0403*** 0.0147 0.0365*** 0.00958





Counties 695 1064 695 1064 695 1064
Outcome mean 235.16 191.61 76.72 60.58 130 120.99
Observations 52,125 79,800 52,125 79,800 52,125 79,800
Notes
The table shows the b4 coefficients obtained using model (3) for larceny, burglary and assault. The column
‘Meth producers’ shows results for counties where at least one methamphetamine lab was seized in 2004. The
column ‘Others’ shows the results for counties where no meth labs were seized in 2004. Panel A uses the sample
including 47 states. Panel B eliminates from the sample states that were subject to only the federal law.
Jurisdictions excluded are: Connecticut, DC, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania and Utah. Crime is transformed into logarithmic form log(1 + z), where z is the crime rate per
100,000 people (the mean for each subsample is reported in the table). I report p-values from hypothesis tests
that the coefficients obtained in meth producers and other counties are equal. All regressions include county
fixed effects, year–month fixed effects, state linear trends, and covariates. Regressions are weighted by
population of the agencies reporting crime in a county–month. Standard errors clustered at the state level are
shown in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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methamphetamine in ‘Other’ counties. Also, there might be crime spillovers across
counties with diverse methamphetamine problems. These possible ‘contaminations’
might reduce the difference in the effects detected across these two subsets of counties. In
sum, these results further corroborate the main hypothesis of the work, revealing
stronger evidence of criminogenic effects in counties where meth labs were likely in
operation before the enactment of the policy. However, they do not exclude the
possibility that similar criminogenic effects could also arise in counties where no such
labs were found.
Second, Table A8 of the Online Appendix shows that counties in which at least one
lab was found were more populated and were experiencing more crime than other
counties in 2003, the year before the first OTC restriction was implemented. Crime
responses in ‘Meth producer’ counties could be explained by prolific criminal networks
gravitating around the domestic production of the drug, which might have been more
reactive to the implementation of the laws. Also, property crimes might have increased
more in more populated counties—where meth labs were found—because more targets
were available for criminals in these locations. In other words, other counties’
characteristics may explain the stronger evidence of criminogenic effects detected in
‘Meth producer’ counties after the passage of the laws. Admittedly, disentangling the
exact mechanisms behind the increase in crime in ‘Meth producer’ counties is difficult
and goes beyond the scope of my paper. However, the dynamics described are consistent
with the main hypothesis of the work, which suggests that the implementation of the
OTC restrictions led to an increase in crime via the disruption of the domestic market for
methamphetamine that was plausibly more prevalent in ‘Meth producer’ counties.
Further robustness checks In Table 6, I show other robustness checks that examine the
sensitivity of b4 estimated on ‘Meth producer’ counties in the entire sample of analysis.
25
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the linear specification with crime rates per 100,000
people as its outcome. Column (2) reports the results of a Poisson count data model.
Column (3) shows the log model as in the baseline specification, for comparison
purposes. Column (4) adds state quadratic trends to column (3). Column (5) adds state
cubic trends to column (4). Column (6) adds 721 county linear trends to column (5).
Column (7) excludes the month in which the OTC restrictions are coded as a fraction of
the month when the law was implemented. Column (8) uses a balanced panel of 23
months before and after the month in which the regulation was implemented. Positive
and significant estimates across the different specifications behave similarly to the state-
level analysis presented in Table 3.26
Arrests, length of the effects, and discussion
Changes in policing effectiveness After the passage of the reforms, local enforcement
agencies might have started chasing local methamphetamine producers. This could have
led police officers to be less effective in deterring property and violent crimes, potentially
inflating the criminogenic effects of the laws. To explore this possibility, I examine the
effects of the reforms using estimating equation (1). I focus on drug-related arrests (sale/
manufacture and consumption of truly addictive synthetic narcotics and other dangerous
non-narcotics) and arrests for assault, burglary and larceny.27 I report the results in
Table A10 of the Online Appendix for the whole estimating sample, and in Table A11 of
the Online Appendix for the sample excluding states where only the federal CMEA was
adopted.
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As in Dobkin et al. (2014), I do not detect any change in arrests for drug possession
or sale of narcotics and non-narcotics. This suggests that enforcement officers did not
target drug users and distributors after the passage of the reforms. The analysis reveals
instead a proportional increase in arrests for assault and burglary. Estimates are around
4.5% (p < 0.01) for assault and 3.4% (p < 0.05) for burglary. For larceny, the point
estimate is around 1.5% but is not significantly different from zero. Excluding states
where only the federal CMEA was implemented, I detect similar effects for assault and
burglary. Moreover, the point estimate for larceny is 3.4% with p < 0.05. These results
reduce the concerns that the criminogenic effects of the laws may be inflated by
enforcement agencies redirecting resources to eradicate the domestic markets for
methamphetamine. If that were the case, then we would have expected to observe an
increase in drug-related arrests, and a decrease or no effects in arrests for property and
violent crimes.28
Length of the effects and possible channels Crime data do not include the necessary
details needed to pin down the exact mechanisms behind the emerging criminal activity
and the dynamics of the effects. However, the evidence gathered in my analysis allows for
an informed discussion of the possible mechanisms at play in this context. The increase in
arrests, proportional to the related increase in crime, could help to explain the short-term
effects of the laws. Local enforcement agencies responded to the increase in property and
violent crimes by executing more arrests, hence incapacitating criminals behind bars.
This might have prevented them from committing crimes over a longer time horizon.
Also, the length of the effects might be consistent with possible motivations behind the
crime increase, such as the initial attempt of domestic producers to keep the production
ongoing, committing thefts to compensate for the higher costs of production imposed by
the laws, before finally quitting the market, and a momentous increase in the cost of
addiction generated by the higher search costs for the drug.29 Similarly, the effects on
violent crimes might reflect the initial competition among criminal groups to fill the
vacant demand for drugs and to fight over the newly available illicit rents.30
Discussion Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) examine a different supply-side measure
targeting methamphetamine in 1995 in California. This was one of the largest shocks that
occurred in any illegal drug market in the USA because of the substantial concentration
in the supply of methamphetamine precursors during the 1990s. They found a large
reduction in supply and demand for drugs, but no significant impact on property and
violent crimes. Although, admittedly, reconciling the differences in the two studies is
difficult because the two policies were different, affected different locations, and were
implemented with a time lag of more than 10 years, a key difference appears to be related
to the effectiveness of the laws in disrupting the supply and demand of the respective drug
market. The policy that I examine had only a limited effect on supply because it affected
small domestic producers constituting a small share of the methamphetamine market
(without disrupting larger producers or Mexican cartels)—and it had no effect on
demand. Thus it could be that these interventions incentivized violence due to the
emergence of competition between multiple unaffected actors, as well as thefts committed
to keep usage constant. In other words, my findings suggest that policy interventions that
have a rather partial effect on supply and no impact on demand could open up the way to
unwarranted crime responses. Overall, I believe that these heterogeneous effects highlight
the importance of producing more research aimed at increasing our understanding of the
possible impacts of supply-side measures on criminal activity.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The US government employs supply-side interventions as a leading strategy to
counteract the expansion of dangerous illegal drug markets. Deepening our
understanding of the criminal consequences of these interventions is therefore critical for
the design of cost-effective regulatory frameworks: these should be aimed at constraining
the growth of illegal drug markets while also mitigating the risks associated with possible
unintended criminal responses.
This paper examines the effects on crime of regulations that reduced access to
common medicines containing pseudoephedrine, which are key precursors needed to
manufacture crystal methamphetamine in small-scale operations. These policies reduced
the number of operating labs by around 36%, heavily disrupting the domestic market for
methamphetamine. I find that the intervention led to an increase of around 4% in both
property and violent crimes. The effects are concentrated within 7 months after the
implementation of the laws, and are stronger in counties where labs producing
methamphetamine were previously in operation. My findings are consistent with the
notion that the criminogenic effects are caused by the disruption of the local domestic
markets for methamphetamine.
Despite the passage of the reforms, traffickers have found ways to avoid these
restrictions, and the number of domestic meth labs in the USA has been increasing
recently.31 This motivates an ongoing policy debate centred on the classification of
pseudoephedrine-based medications as prescription-only drugs. Oregon (as of July 2006)
and Mississippi (as of July 2010) are the only two states that have classified
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine as Schedule III substances, requiring patients to obtain a
medical prescription to get these medicines. Between 2010 and January 2013, at least 69
similar bills were introduced in 18 US states. Most of these bills were referred to specific
committees, and none of them has been approved yet.
My findings convey timely policy implications. They suggest that further restricting
access to methamphetamine’s chemical precursors could lead to an increase in criminal
activity in the USA, particularly in areas where the domestic production of this drug is
more prevalent. Thus my results provide direct support for supply-side interventions that
should be implemented in conjunction with crime-prevention strategies targeting well-
known hotbeds for the domestic production of methamphetamine. Also, my work
suggests the need to implement supply-side interventions that internalize the probable
impacts on consumers. For instance, parallel social programmes aimed at managing the
demand side of the market might attenuate the emergence of criminal responses that could
be connected with the compulsive need of heavy drug users to fund their addiction. This
suggestion is in line with the recently signed 21st Century Cures Act, which will provide
$1 billion in funding for demand-side interventions, such as prevention and substance
abuse treatment, which aim to reduce the prevalence of addiction (Alpert et al. 2018).
My paper also informs policymakers outside the USA about possible drawbacks of
similar regulations to the ones examined in my work. In fact, Eastern Europe, Africa,
South-east Asia, the Middle East and Australia are experiencing a giant rise in the crystal
meth epidemic and facing the negative consequences associated with the propagation of
this dangerous drug (UNODC 2015). To conclude, I believe that interesting and
promising avenues for future research will emerge in the attempt to deeply scrutinize the
interplay between government measures that legitimately challenge the expansion of
illegal drug markets, with possible criminal responses originating from changes in the
supply and demand sides of these widespread clandestine markets.
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NOTES
1. The void in the domestic supply was filled by methamphetamine arriving fromMexican cartels. The share of
methamphetamine produced in labs located in Mexico increased from 65% to 80% after the laws were
implemented (see https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/interim_rpt.pdf, accessed 30 May
2020).
2. See the final section for a more detailed discussion about these aspects.
3. A typical domestic producer of methamphetamine is a heavy user who started manufacturing the drug to
sustain his drug addiction (Eck and Gersh 2000). The laws might have increased the cost of addiction for
these users, who were previously able to sustain the habit by inexpensively producing methamphetamine in
their small labs, and after the laws had to pay more in order to keep usage constant. Also, users who were
not producing methamphetamine but were gravitating around domestic production might have experienced
an increase in the search costs for the drug, which before the laws was readily available within the close
network of drug addicts (Sexton et al. 2006).
4. The National Association of Counties administered an annual survey to local enforcement agencies to
assess the harms connected with the proliferation of various illegal drugs. In the 2005 report, 58% of the
counties ranked methamphetamine as the most dangerous drug within their territory because of its ability to
foster property and violent crimes. In 50% of the counties, 1 in 5 jail inmates was housed because of meth-
related crimes. In the other half of the counties surveyed, 17% reported that more than half of their prison
population was incarcerated because of meth-related crimes.
5. This estimate was obtained by considering: the costs of crime for larceny ($2139), burglary ($13,096) and
assault ($87,238) reported by Heaton (2010); the pre-intervention monthly crime levels in counties where
labs were operating prior to the reform; and the length of the impacts on crime detected in my analysis.
6. For a systematic review of the effects of drug law enforcement on drug market violence see Werb et al.
(2011). See also Reuter (2009).
7. Cold tablets are mixed with sodium hydroxide, anhydrous ammonia, iodine, matches containing red
phosphorus, Drano, ether, brake and lighter fluid, and hydrochloric acid. These products are easily found in
local stores. The entire chemical process is performed in self-made chemical labs hidden in apartments,
caravans, garages or hotel rooms (see Figure A1 of the Online Appendix).
8. I did not find any evidence suggesting that there was a concern that the OTC restrictions would have
affected property and violent crimes, or that these restrictions were implemented alongside monitoring or
crime-prevention programmes. If law enforcement agencies were concerned about the impact on property
and violent crimes, then it is plausible to assume that more resources would have been directed toward
preventing this potential increase in crime. In this case, my estimates of the criminogenic effects of the laws
could represent a lower bound of the true effects of the reforms.
9. The estimation of heterogeneous effects by type of law could help us to understand which restrictions had
the largest impact on crime. Unfortunately, the laws were typically implemented in bundles, preventing a
credible identification of the separate effects of each restriction.
10. The use of data voluntarily reported cannot inform us about possible criminogenic effects arising in non-
reporting agencies. If the decision of not reporting property and violent crime is uncorrelated with the
presence of methamphetamine in the territory (an assumption that seems plausible but that, however, cannot
be formally tested due to the absence of data on the spread of methamphetamine at the agency level), thenmy
results could be interpreted as an average effect of the policy across all US enforcement agencies.
11. The Online Data Appendix provides detailed information on the construction of the final databases in
which agency data are aggregated at the state and county levels.
12. These data were downloaded from https://www.dea.gov/clan-lab (accessed 1 June 2020).
13. The same controls were also used by Dobkin et al. (2014).
14. Suppose that a state enacted a law on 21 April 2006. I would record the variable OTCst as 0 for all the
months prior to the implementation, 1 for all the months afterwards, and (3121)/21 = 0.476 for the month
of April 2006.
15. It is not feasible to include a full set of event dummies. This inclusion would be collinear with state fixed
effects and time fixed effects.
16. County-specific monthly covariates on weather conditions and socioeconomic factors are not available.
17. Larceny is the unlawful taking, carrying, leading or riding away of property from the possession of another.
This is the most common type of theft crime. Common types of larcenies include shoplifting, pickpocketing,
purse snatching and theft of objects from motor vehicles. Burglary is the unlawful entry into a structure to
commit a felony or theft.
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18. Connecticut, DC, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah
were subject to only the federal CMEA. DEA data indicate that in states adopting an internal law, 4.2 labs
per 100,000 people were discovered in 2004. In contrast, in jurisdictions that were subject to only the federal
law, just 0.24 labs per 100,000 people were detected in the same year. The meth epidemic was stronger in the
central and western parts of the USA.
19. It is not possible to consistently estimate the effects of the federal CMEA in the subset of states that were
subject to only this law. This is because the date of implementation (April 2006) is the same across this
subset of states, and the rollout dummy (OTCs,t) would be perfectly collinear with the common time trends
indicator (ct).
20. Information on community programmes for treating addiction in the USA at the state–month level during
the period of analysis is unavailable to the researcher.
21. These are the crimes that appear more frequently in the data. The outcome means for larceny, burglary and
assault are 210.7, 67 and 122.7 crimes per 100,000 people, respectively. See Table 1.
22. Keeping the within-state variation fixed and moving the sample years before and after the implementation
of the laws allows us to examine whether the results are driven by seasonality.
23. Figure A2 of the Online Appendix shows the event-study analysis excluding state-specific linear trends.
Results are similar.
24. The ideal data to test this hypothesis would be a census of meth labs in the USA before the laws were
effectively implemented. Because of the criminal nature of this business, such records do not exist. Instead, I
used information on the locations of labs discovered by law enforcement agents prior to the intervention.
To the extent of my knowledge, no national county-level data exist on the usage of methamphetamine
before the laws went into effect, which could also have been used as an indirect proxy for the local domestic
production of the drug.
25. As for equation (1), I also show the sensitivity of the b4 estimates by gradually including state-specific linear
trends and all the covariates in the ‘Meth producer’ and ‘Other’ counties (Tables A6 and A7 of the Online
Appendix, respectively).
26. Dobkin et al. (2014) detect weaker impacts of the laws on the domestic markets for methamphetamine in
counties sharing the borders with states with no regulation in place, possibly because local producers were
able to circumvent the laws obtaining pseudoephedrine-based medications from these neighbouring states. I
hence examine the impact of the regulations on crime in counties bordering a state without similar
restrictions. All details are provided in the Online Appendix.
27. The Online Data Appendix discusses the details of the UCR data on arrests. Table A9 of the Online
Appendix provides descriptive statistics. Arrests for sale or possession of methamphetamine are not
separately reported and are included in the category of ‘Other dangerous non-narcotics’.
28. Also, the implementation of the policies made it easier for local enforcement officers to detect the few labs
still in operation. This is because the laws required the names of customers to be noted in special logbooks
that were accessible to police forces. If anything, this seems to reduce the concerns that an increase in
policing effort aimed at contracting the local production of methamphetamine could drive the rise in crime
detected after the passage of the reforms.
29. Sexton et al. (2006) describe that increased difficulty in finding methamphetamine precursors, and their
higher prices on the black market, led the majority of domestic producers to eventually leave the illicit
market. In affected communities, there was some delay in the arrival of Mexican methamphetamine, and
users had to ‘hunt’ down methamphetamine. Also, in some cases, the Mexican methamphetamine was more
expensive than that produced domestically.
30. Dobkin et al. (2014) document a large drop in the purity of meth at the beginning of 2006, while many of
the OTC regulations happened midway through 2005. I have estimated event-study specifications
comparing early vs. late adopters in an attempt to assess whether the short-term nature of the crime increase
is driven by this shift in the market. This analysis leads to imprecise estimates that are available on request.
31. According to the 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment, methamphetamine is available throughout the
USA, with the highest availability in the West and Midwest regions of the country. However, in recent
years, methamphetamine has been increasing in prevalence in areas that have, historically, not been major
markets for the drug, particularly the North-east.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix A: Tables A1–A11; Figures A1 and A2
Appendix B:Graphical spillover analysis; Table B1
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